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ABSTRACT
Background The protection of personal information privacy has become one of the 
most pressing security concerns for record keepers: this will become more onerous 
with the introduction of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 
mid-2014. Many institutions, both large and small, have yet to implement the essen-
tial infrastructure for data privacy protection and patient consent and control when 
accessing and sharing data; even more have failed to instil a privacy and security 
awareness mindset and culture amongst their staff. Increased regulation, together 
with better compliance monitoring, has led to the imposition of increasingly significant 
monetary penalties for failure to protect privacy: these too are set to become more 
onerous under the GDPR, increasing to a maximum of 2% of annual turnover.
Objective There is growing pressure in clinical environments to deliver shared patient 
care and to support this with integrated information. This demands that more informa-
tion passes between institutions and care providers without breaching patient privacy 
or autonomy. This can be achieved with relatively minor enhancements of existing 
infrastructures and does not require extensive investment in inter-operating electronic 
records: indeed such investments to date have been shown not to materially improve 
data sharing.1
Requirements for privacy There is an ethical duty as well as a legal obliga-
tion on the part of care providers (and record keepers) to keep patient information 
confidential and to share it only with the authorisation of the patient. To achieve this 
information storage and retrieval, communication systems must be appropriately 
configured. There are many components of this, which are discussed in this paper. 
Patients may consult clinicians anywhere and at any time: therefore, their data 
must be available for recipient-driven retrieval (i.e. like the World Wide Web) under 
patient control and kept private: a method for delivering this is outlined.
Keywords: Electronic medical records, information privacy, medical record 
sharing, shared care
What this paper adds Many record keepers strictly limit sharing of information 
with colleagues on the grounds of privacy concern, and the members of staff expose 
private data to risks simply because they do not understand those risks. Even where 
those privacy concerns are not the issue, record keepers may still be unable to share 
information because of the difficulty of obtaining access to it, and of retrieving files that 
are compatible with the recipient’s reader systems. This paper summarises the key 
issues that must be addressed in configuring a system that properly protects privacy. It 
outlines how data can be readily shared without the need for costly investment in inter-
operating systems. In addition, it indicates how patients can be put in control of access 
to their own records—if they so choose.
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HeAlTH InfORmATIOn And PRIvACy
Personalised information is generally private. The ethical 
principle of respect for personal autonomy holds that an 
individual should be in control of their own person, as well 
as their own information, and the law supports this through 
several different bodies of legislation. The health information 
privacy ‘problem’ arises because every medical record typi-
cally contains elements of context (names, addresses, dates, 
places, clinics, and so on) routinely embedded in the stored 
clinical data (content). There is a demand for that information 
because it is of value not just to care providers, but also to 
others—such as financiers, employers, and solicitors—and 
even more so where the patient concerned is a celebrity. 
Historically, where records were kept on paper, storing con-
text with the content was essential to ensure that the record 
stayed associated with the correct patient and was stored in 
the same folder as their other records: there was no other 
tag for checking that the records in a specific folder actually 
were associated with that patient. However, that is no longer 
necessary with electronic records systems.
It is widely accepted that the patient does not own the phys-
ical substance of their medical records: ownership is vested 
in the doctor, clinic, or institution that created the records. 
However, their ownership is effectively limited to little more 
than a custodial role as the owner cannot sell, edit, or destroy 
content in the medical records, and must make them avail-
able to the patient and his nominated agents and care provid-
ers, although there may be some limited right on the part of 
the custodian to restrict what the patient and his agents can 
1. Each identifiable clinical record shall be marked with an access control list naming the people or
groups of people who may read it and append data to it. The system shall prevent anyone not on
the access control list from accessing the record in any way.
2. A clinician may open a record with herself and the patient on the access control list. Where a 
patient has been referred, she may open a record with herself, the patient, and the referring
clinician(s) on the access control list.
3. One of the clinicians on the access control list must be marked as being responsible. Only she may
alter the access control list, and she may only add other health care professionals to it.
4. The responsible clinician must notify the patient of the names on his record’s access control list
when it is opened, of all subsequent additions, and whenever responsibility is transferred. His
consent must also be obtained, except in an emergency of in the case of statutory exemptions.
5. No-one shall have the ability to delete clinical information until the appropriate time period has
expired.
6. All accesses to clinical records shall be marked on the record with the subject’s name, as well as 
the date and time. An audit trail must also be kept of all deletions.
7. Information derived from record A may be appended to record B if and only if B’s access control
list is contained in A’s.
8. There shall be effective measures to prevent the aggregation of personal health information. In
particular, patients must receive special notification if any person whom it is proposed to add to
their access control list already has access to personal health information on a large number of
people.
9. Computer systems that handle personal health information shall have a subsystem that enforces
the above principles in an effective way. Its effectiveness shall be subject to evaluation by
independent experts.
figure 1 Anderson’s nine principles6
access. The owner does not even have the right to share 
the records, whilst they remain identifiable, with third parties 
except with the consent of the patient.2 Therefore, control 
over what can be done with the records, whilst they remain 
identifiable, is effectively vested in the patient, and the records 
must otherwise be kept private and confidential.
In a previous issue of IPC, Harrison and Booth3 explored 
how individuals might become guardians of their own data 
and digital identities, including alternate identities; they outline 
their virtual home concept in which individuals have an online 
‘space’ where they can store data, or links to data held else-
where, and which could act as their authentication and privacy 
agent. In a more recent issue of IPC (2008), Neame4 address-
ing the same theme outlined a schema for managing health 
care (patient and professional) identification/authentication 
services using tokens (e.g. smart cards) for authorisation of 
record access. This paper draws on ideas put forward in both 
those articles, as well as relevant work by Schoenberg and 
Safran,5 whose interest was in finding a means for exchang-
ing patient information with privacy and using the Internet 
(discussed below).
KeePIng ReCORdS PRIvATe
Whilst electronic records were still in an early stage of their 
development, Anderson6 as long ago as 1996 set out a series 
of nine privacy policy principles (Figure 1) relating to their man-
agement and sharing. The framework applies only to personally 
identifiable information, and remains generally sound today: 
however, failure to implement the principles is widespread.
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PRIvACy BReACHeS ARISe PRInCIPAlly 
fROm fIve SOuRCeS 
1. Inadequate identification and authentication 
of individuals, allowing significant numbers of 
authorised system users to pose as someone else 
(using privileges belonging to another person).7
2. Ready accessibility of electronically stored information 
where unrestricted record access and read/write 
privileges are available to vastly more users than just 
those with a need to know and with the authorisation 
of the patient concerned; inadequate logging of user 
activity and monitoring of logs for abuses.
3. Inappropriate disclosure,8 for example, where data 
have been exported from the institution (on paper, 
on memory media, in mobile devices/laptops, in 
communications, and so on) without authorisation, 
and/or whilst inadequately secured, and/or passed 
to a recipient where privacy protection measures are 
inadequate. Also disclosures made without patient 
authorisation.
4. Reporting requirements, some statutory and deriving 
from primary legislation, others arising out of 
departmental directives, and all requiring disclosures 
of personal information provided in confidence. 
5. Poor security, failing to protect the system against 
external hackers, and malware; permitting users to 
access instant messaging9 services and system ‘back 
doors’ (e.g. implemented for remote management), 
which permit external access to the system often 
bypassing security controls.
The demand for shared information for shared care is very 
strong and growing, and overly restrictive approaches to infor-
mation exchange are not fit for the purpose and infringe patient 
rights (Panel 1).10 Around half of the security breaches arise 
as a result of authorised users abusing their privileges,11,12 
and therefore no amount of blocking external access will solve 
the problem. On the other hand externally driven attacks are 
becoming increasingly common, with around 100,000 new 
malware variants appearing every day, and powerful hacker 
toolkits being readily available to buy or rent on the Web. 
dISCuSSIOn 
Personal health information has a value: unfortunately, its 
value is recognised not just within the health care sector, but 
also outside, and around one-third to one-half of all reported 
security breaches arise in the health care sector.13,14 There is 
a significant financial incentive to acquire private health infor-
mation for purposes such as decisions about employment 
and finance, and exerting improper influence. The issues 
associated with abuse of personal health information have 
led to public expectations of professional ethical behaviour 
dating back to Hippocrates more than two millennia ago, as 
well as modern legislation.
Amongst the most effective measures for privacy protec-
tion are the education of users, and the careful formulation of 
a contract between them and the record keeper, setting down 
user privileges and making abuses easy to litigate. In many 
instances, users are given information system access privi-
leges, but not made explicitly aware of their responsibilities 
or limits, nor of the penalties for abuses. All authorised users 
must be identifiable, and authenticated, for example, by use 
of a smart token; and they must be held accountable for all 
actions undertaken on their account. Given that around half 
of the breaches arise as a result of authorised user actions, 
this is a vital area to address: some breaches are deliberate, 
but others are a result of poor IT practice and lack of basic 
IT education.15
Whilst there are legal bases for prosecutions in common 
law (breach of fiduciary duty), as well as in statute (under data 
protection, privacy, and human rights law), obtaining a con-
viction may not be easy, and the penalties they impose may 
be uncertain and inappropriate. Unfortunately, the impact of 
the EU Privacy directive (95/46/EC) (Panel 2)16 has been 
limited, but this will be greatly strengthened by the introduc-
tion in mid-2014 of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) (Panel 2).17 At present, it is often better to set down 
penalties in an employment contract where enforcement is 
simpler. More significant in many instances are the penal-
ties that can be imposed by professional associations for 
unprofessional/unethical behaviour, including expulsion from 
the association, which may affect the right to practice: this 
 promotes the importance of self-regulation, although still 
requiring monitoring.
The not uncommon practice of ‘borrowing’ an identification/
userID from someone else, or using ‘common’ UserIDs, such 
as the same one for all staff of a clinic or ward, or having 
‘floating’ UserIDs for a given role (e.g. ‘DutySurgicalRegistrar’) 
are all incompatible with proper user identification and 
authentication: the actual user at a given time may not be 
known for certain. The security system must require that 
users are positively authenticated by some unique physical 
security element, such as a unique token, and/or a biometric 
identifier (e.g. fingerprint/iris/facial scan). Where a request 
for access emanates from an external IP address, and/or 
the user is unidentified, access should be restricted solely 
to ‘public’ data—although those ‘public data’ can readily be 
re-designed for sharing with privacy (see below).
Internal data processing is often overlooked as a source of 
privacy breach, but the routine practice of including personal 
identifiers with data being processed for internal manage-
ment and claims purposes breaches privacy. Unless both 
clinical and personal information are required at the same 
time and place, they should be separated, and the data 
processed under an alternate code, such as the system-
generated record or event identifier. Internal IT management 
is another potential source of breach: by the nature of their 
work, IT staff generally have access to all stored data, as 
well as to the security system that protects them. Having 
a procedure for active monitoring and oversight of all staff 
with access to sensitive data is vital, as is ensuring that they 
delete data that are no longer required in a way that prevents 
their subsequent recovery.
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Confidential data in transit are always at risk from eavesdrop-
ping, since the communication channels are for the most part 
‘public’. Data are equally at risk when stored on portable media 
that can be removed from institutional control and are not secured 
(e.g. on notebooks and memory sticks), since misplacement of 
the device can lead to major disclosures. Therefore, encryption 
of data capable of being exported is essential where personal 
identifiers are included, and the use of asymmetric encryption, 
such as using a public key infrastructure,18 is strongly recom-
mended. Some or all of the technical and data processing 
services may be outsourced to contractors: just like the regu-
lar user contract, the outsourcing contract needs to address 
data protection and privacy issues, and include penalties for 
breach.19,20 Passing data to a third party whose privacy protec-
tion and security measures are inadequate is a clear breach of 
the law on the part of the sender, whether or not it is an offence 
on the part of the recipient. 
Ensuring that the system is not abused requires both 
 preventive and detective security elements. Prevention is dis-
cussed above—but what about detection? In detective terms, 
there are options to implement keystroke logging so that it 
is possible to state definitively who did and saw what, and 
when. Patterns of access to records can be monitored and 
audited, and the system can be rolled back to any point in 
time to establish what information was available and viewed 
in making a specific decision. 
CHeCKlIST Of PRIvACy InfRASTRuCTuRe 
RequIRemenTS
A system for ensuring information privacy in electronic 
records systems must include
1.  Identification: users must be uniquely identified, and 
their identities authenticated for issuance of a UserID, 
affording them privileges for the use of the system. 
2.  user contract, privileges, and penalties: users 
must have a clear understanding of their system 
privileges and responsibilities set out in the form 
of a binding user contract, including penalties for 
abuses. The contract acts as a guide to users to  
self-regulate their actions and, together with the user 
logs, can be the basis for proceedings for abuses. 
3.  Prevention by access control: the system should 
be configured to prevent users accessing records 
and functions, for which they have no authorisation, 
for example, through the use of application access 
rights and individual file access tables. Where this is 
not technically possible, activity monitoring should be 
comprehensive. 
4.  detection by logs and audit: every action by every 
user must be tracked using a data logging system, 
which records UserID, dates, times, terminal identity, 
and keystrokes. This makes it possible to reconstruct 
exactly what that user saw and did, as well as to 
analyse the data logs to audit for activity patterns that 
are unusual and could suggest impropriety. Frequent 
routine monitoring of logs is essential.
5.  export and outsourcing control: where data are 
in a form that may be exported from the security 
controls of the system, that export must be duly 
authorised, the recipient or responsible party 
identified, and the recipients privacy and security 
provisions approved. The data exported should be the 
minimum consistent with the purpose, and its security 
assured (e.g. by de-identification and/or encryption)
6.  Record processing: Data should not be processed 
(e.g. for business management, finance, or planning), 
with both identifiers and clinical details displayed 
except where access to both is essential for the 
purposes, hence preventing unnecessary disclosures 
of personal records.
7.  Definitive disposal and destruction: where 
personal data are consigned for destruction, steps 
must be taken not only to ‘delete’ the file(s), but also 
to ensure that the deleted files cannot be recovered 
either from the deleted media or from backup/
archived copies.
8.  Technical staff oversight: IT staff, both internal 
and external/contractors, are likely to have the 
technical capability to view anything as well as 
to conceal what they view/do from data logging, 
and even to lay false trails. Their activities should 
be overseen by supervisors and monitored to 
prevent breaches.
9.  Responsible officer: an officer of the enterprise should 
be charged with responsibility for personal information 
privacy management, and required to make regular 
detailed reports to management, including audits. This 
will become a legal requirement under the GDPR for all 
institutions with more than 250 staff.
The above can assure the privacy protection of records, 
and, with the exception of record access tables (2 above), 
which may require application modifications, they should all 
be readily implementable on current systems. They should 
absolutely not become an index of excuses for failure to 
share records.
SHARIng dATA fOR SHARed CARe
Sharing care data is increasingly essential: the Caldicott 
Report10 is clear that too many institutions hide behind ‘data 
protection’ as a reason not to share data, and proposes mak-
ing ‘non-sharing’ an offence. The key to the private sharing 
of data is placing the patient in control of their own records 
and of who may access them. Schoenberg and Safran5 
outlined a scheme for an Internet-based but confidential 
medical records repository: the scheme proposed the Web as 
the communication medium, although the record repositories 
relied heavily on being secured through the use of names, 
passwords, and numbers (e.g. NHS number). The problem 
with such national numbers is that too many individuals have 
access to the name:number lookup tables for any effective 
privacy, and such an approach will not be acceptable under 
the GDPR. Schoenberg and Safran argued against the use 
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of memory tokens on the basis that the public did not appear 
to like them: the public appear to love them based on the vast 
numbers of smart cards in everyday use for banking, mobile 
phones, store cards, and so on.
The scheme proposed here is based on the same ideas, 
but ensures that the data remain private and confidential. 
Patients would be provided with an index of their care 
events and resulting records made, together with a URL 
pointer to where specific records can be found. The index 
can be held on a memory device, preferably secured with a 
PIN, which ‘points to’ the URLs where each record is stored 
on the Internet. Alternatively, these data can be uploaded 
to the patient’s secure Internet depository, which they can 
access to retrieve records, or pass them to another party. 
The records to which this index points will be secured 
against external or internal privacy abusers. They may be 
encrypted versions of the original (decryption keys held on 
the index) or an edited version of the original where identi-
fiers (names, dates, places, clinics, and so on) have been 
erased, leaving just the clinical data: either method makes 
the records readily accessible but valueless except to those 
who hold the context and keys. Alternatively, the records 
and/or index can be uploaded to a place nominated by the 
patient—for example, their personal secured depository on 
the Web. Any clinician with a browser and the patient index 
device (or their depository keys) can thus reassemble and 
read full records of the patient as and when they require 
them. This scheme has no need for development of com-
plex inter-operable systems, as it currently seems to be the 
preferred, but costly, way forward. 
The information for sharing can be structured for greater 
utility (e.g. using XML tags), and can include internal integrity 
checks: more detail is provided elsewhere.21
COnCluSIOn
The paper presents an overview of the practical information 
privacy issues that record keepers must address as a matter of 
priority: privacy enforcement is becoming stricter, and breaches 
may incur a major financial penalty. The main sources of 
breaches are identified, together with effective actions to pre-
vent them: with minor exceptions none of these should present 
major implementation issues, but there seem to be problems 
of mindset and education which mitigate against this.
Cost-effective methods for sharing information while respect-
ing privacy are desperately needed. There is no need for major 
investments in interoperability of systems: the sharing of data 
can readily be achieved with existing electronic information 
management infrastructures with the simple addition of an 
option for patient control (possibly but not necessarily using 
an identification and control device, such as a smart card), and 
a routine for posting secured copies of records on the Internet.
further research/work
Two infrastructure developments are necessary for the sharing 
scheme to function efficiently. One is that those patients who 
want to avail themselves of the ability to take control of their 
records need to be provided with a smart memory device that 
identifies them, and can carry pointers to where their records 
are stored, as well as encryption keys and additional con-
text where needed. An alternative would be for them to have 
an online secure deposit facility into which these details are 
passed. The other is that care service providers and institu-
tions would need to generate encrypted or de-contextualised 
sharing records (in HTML) stored on the Web or in the patients 
secure online deposit facility. All the other technology required 
is already in place and needs minimal additional investment.
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APPendIx
PAnel 1
Caldicott Reports 1 and 2
The UK Health and Social Care Acta (2012) makes strong arguments in favour of NHS reforms to 
contain costs and improve services. In particular it aims to find ways of joining up the currently frag-
mented care records, of responding to what patients are saying, and of increasing accountability 
(highly relevant in the context of recent revelations about poor performance and avoidable deaths in 
various trusts). To achieve these, the Act paves the way for ready access to care-related information 
(‘evidence’) to support commissioning, to assure quality, and to inform best practices, whilst at the 
same time making clear the need for this to be achieved with full patient confidentiality.
Some 20 years ago in 1997, Dame Fiona Caldicott was asked to review the issue of protection of 
patient confidentiality at a time when the newly formed ‘internal market’ was sharing data more freely 
than was perhaps ethical or legal. This resulted in a reportb that identified concerns and set out some 
basic principles. Amongst these were
 • Need to replace as far as possible patient identifiers with other tags, with a specific 
caution that where coded identifiers or NHS numbers are used, there must be strict control 
over who may have access to the identity look-up tables (recommendations 8,9,13,16).
 • Need to restrict the amount of data transferred to the minimum consistent with the needs 
(Executive Summary V).
 • Need to encrypt sensitive messages passing outside the institution (recommendation 10).
Dame Fiona Caldicott was again charged with looking again at the issues of data sharing and privacy 
protection and reportedc in 2013. The specific context is the failure by many institutions to share 
information with others, citing judicious information governance as the impediment. The central issue 
is the balance between individual privacy and the best interests of the community in terms of the care 
for others and improvements to services informed by access to private data, and a critical problem is 
the lack of awareness and understanding of the issues and regulations that pertain.
The recent announcementd that government will seek to acquire without consent patient identifiable 
information from primary care to be placed in a centralised database for access by researchers sug-
gests a significant change to the current arrangements whereby patients have the right to opt out 
of having their personal information uploaded to the summary care record.e The proposed omission 
of names and addresses, to be replaced by NHS numbers, does not suggest any sort of robust 
approach to privacy protection (see paper).
ahttp://www.dh.gov.uk/health/2012/06/act-explained/
bhttp://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4068404.pdf
chttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192572/2900774_InfoGovernance_accv2.pdf
dhttp://www.commissioningboard.nhs.uk/everyonecounts/
ehttp://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/scr/staff/faqs/mpsfaqs.pdf
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fhttp://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf
ghttp://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf
hhttp://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf
PAnel 2
eu Privacy directive 95/46/eC and new draft european general data Protection Regulation
Information privacy and data protection became a significant issue when diverse national approaches 
to the issue began to impede free data flows. In 1980, the OECD set out a series of principlesf to 
address this, but these were not legally binding or enforceable, which led to the European Directive 
95/46/EC.g This Directive did not automatically become part of national privacy legislation, but 
required implementation through national legislation—which was done with variable rigour and 
 sympathy for the core principles. These could be summarised as
Purpose: subjects should be clear about the purpose of the data being collected, and consent 
to it; the data collected should be the minimum consistent with achieving the stated purpose.
Storage: personal data should be stored securely against all threats and abuses.
use: personal data should be used only for the purposes declared at the time of collection, 
and nothing else.
disclosure: personal data should not be disclosed without the consent of the subject.
Correction: data subjects should be able to access their personal data and require corrections 
to be made where these were necessary.
destruction: personal data should be kept only until the purpose of their collection has been 
achieved, and should then be destroyed.
Responsibility: data controllers should be held accountable to the data subjects for their 
adherence to the principles of the Directive.
The variability in legislation bringing these principles into practice at the national level led in 2012 to 
the EU preparing a General Data Protection Regulation,h reinforcing and extending the basic prin-
ciples. This differs legally from the original Directive in that a Regulation requires no enabling national 
legislation but is automatically incorporated into and takes precedence over national legislation in all 
member countries, thereby at a stroke harmonising data protection across the Union. The Regulation 
when introduced in mid-2014 will replace all provisions of and derogations from the Directive.
The Regulation, although not yet finalised, promises significant change particularly by strengthen-
ing individual rights, increasing the responsibilities and accountabilities of data controllers (DC), 
and increasing the monitoring and enforcement by data protection authorities (DPA). Perhaps most 
significantly, penalties for failure to comply rise from the previous maximum of £500,000 to a maxi-
mum of 2% of annual turnover, a figure guaranteed to command the attention of CEOs, and likely to 
persuade Boards of the advisability of investing urgently in privacy infrastructure and education. Of 
particular significance for health care, the Regulation strengthens the requirement that any use of 
personal data, other than for the sole purpose for which they were gathered, requires subject con-
sent. In addition, it excludes the fact of the use of a service as giving ‘implied consent’ to other uses 
of the data, leaving the burden of proof of properly obtained consent with DCs. It makes notification 
of breaches to DPAs within 24 h a duty of DCs. It requires businesses to provide accessible and 
transparent policies regarding processing of personal data as well as exercising data subjects rights. 
It includes a personal right to be forgotten and to data erasure, as well as a right to data portability to 
move to another service provider. It clarifies that data collected under EU law can only be processed 
consistent with EU law, even if the data are exported into another approved jurisdiction where local 
laws differ. In addition, it makes all parties to any infringement of the Regulation jointly and severally 
liable in law. All of these will have a considerable impact on health care institutions.
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